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1. Introduction 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)1 is playing an increasing relevant role in the world 
economy. Policy makers of developing countries consider FDI as a possible strategy to 
attract capital, technology, marketing and management capabilities. In the last 15 years 
FDI increased much more than standard trade. For Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 
intra-firm trade replaces and complements international trade (Dunning, 1993). 
International competitiveness -considering the ongoing liberalisation- “imposes” to cut 
costs and “induces” large and medium size enterprises to use FDI and to become 
transnational companies. This mechanism is going to rule the “globalisation game” and 
in developing countries to influence where business will be a success and where poverty 
a persistence. This implies an effort of these countries to arrange the right ‘conditions’ 
to attract FDI, often forgetting that the advantages -in terms of socio-economic 
development- cannot be obtained automatically. Low income developing countries 
which have not the capability to attract FDI and especially to capture the benefits seem 
to be condemned from globalisation to look from the “window” the success of the other 
countries. 
In other words, FDI “should be taken, but seriously”. China did so from 1979. Now the 
People Republic of China (PRC) is among largest recipient of FDI in the world often 
second only to USA. In particular, China had the capability to capture the benefits that 
FDI can generate. In the last two decades, economic growth of Chinese coastal region 
benefited from FDI. In China foreign capital takes the forms of loans and FDI which is 
the main component (around 90% since 1992, 95% in 1999). In 2000 around 48% of 
Chinese exports are from FDI. 
The aim is to understand throughout an empirical analysis which factors affected the 
amount of FDI received by the Chinese provinces during the economic transition. In 
addition to other studies, we examine if a different level of institutional changes -
reached by the province economic systems- determine a higher FDI inflow. 
Understanding Chinese experience in an opportunity to interpret the determinants on the 
location of FDI in general and for transition economies in particular. 
                                                          
1 International capital flows in which a firm in one country creates or expands a subsidiary in another (Krugman and 
Obstfeld, 2000). 
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FDI’s impact differs from other types of capital investment as it depends on various 
types of externalities and spillovers which are combined with and depend on specific 
factor endowments of the host country (for a survey see De Mello 1997). Although very 
challenging, the positive and negative role of FDI in China economic development is an 
argument per se and will not be examined in this paper. 
The paper is structured into six sections. In the next section, the second, the “transition 
march” from a close socialist economy to the open socialist market economy is briefly 
depicted. In the third section, the main theoretical approaches and empirical studies are 
briefly examined in order to formulate an interpretative approach. At the end of this 
section the model utilised for the empirical analysis is specified. In the fourth section, 
the panel data set utilised (11 years from 1986 to 1996) and the method used for the 
econometric estimation are presented. In order to capture better the determinants of FDI, 
the estimations of the coefficients are obtained considering all the Chinese provinces 
together and also the coastal provinces separately. In the fifth section the empirical 
results on the factors which determined the different FDI distribution among Chinese 
provinces are examined. In the last section some conclusions are presented. 
 
 
2. Transition and FDI: the Chinese road 
 
The PRC was one of the first socialist planned economies to start the transition and to 
“open the door” to foreign investment. Among ex-socialist countries the PRC China 
received 67% of all the FDI from 1992 to 1999. In China the FDI net inflow passed 
from 0.5% of GDP in 1985 to 3.9% of GDP in 1999. In the same period the share of 
FDI on capital formation passed from 1.4 to 10.5% (World Bank, WDI, 2001). Then, if 
FDI is dominant in the energy sector in Russia and NIS in China -as in Central and 
Eastern European countries and Vietnam- is much more associated with the 
globalisation of production. The FDI takes forms of equity joint ventures, co-operative 
operations, wholly foreign-owned enterprises co-operative, co-operative development. 
The joint venture is the most popular form of FDI (especially before 1992) followed by 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises.  
Chinese FDI inflow is characterised by large spatial differences with huge concentration 
into some provinces (see, table 1). From 1979 to 1999 more than 30% of FDI where in 
Guangdong province and, in the same period, the 12 Coastal provinces (including 
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Guangdong) attracted around 90% of the total FDI (Di Tommaso and Bellandi, 2006). 
In table 1 the provinces are classified into three macro-region East, Middle and West. 
The different inflow of foreign investment among provinces can be emphasised by 
considering the FDI per capita between 1989 and 1999. For instance, if PRC on average 
received around 240 US dollars per capita Shanghai, Tianjin and Guangdong received 
respectively more than 1600, 1200 and 1100 while Qinghai only 3. In the same period 
the best European transition economies recipient Hungary and Czechoslovakia received 
more than 1800 and 1600 US dollars per capita. In 1999 around 46% of Chinese exports 
are from FDI, ranging from the 70% of Tianjin to the 1% of Qinghai. 
Differently from other countries in transition such as the East European countries, CIS 
and NIS, China did not use FDI to privatise its economy. For transition economies the 
foreign investment are not only a source of capital but also a driving force for 
restructuring towards the market system. Although, foreign investment is certainly not a 
solution for achieving overall privatisation, it was used in many East European 
countries, CIS and NIS. Also for this reason the inflow of foreign direct investment was 
high among 1994 and 1999 but not constant during time recording peaks in coincidence 
with the privatisation boom. China and Vietnam received in those years a more constant 
inflow of FDI since they where de-linked with privatisation and connected to the 
globalisation of production. Considering East European countries, CIS and NIS, on one 
hand the ‘new’ governments hoped to attract foreign investors and the legislation was 
accordingly made much more favourable than it was before. On the other hand, the 
authorities had to take care of nationalistic feelings and dispel the idea that foreigners 
would select the best choices so as to make big profits Lavigne (1999). Under the 
communist regime, a legal framework for foreign investment had been created in all 
countries. In the 1960s in Yugoslavia, in the 1970s in Hungary, Romania, Poland and 
China, in the 1980s in Bulgaria, Russia and Czechoslovakia (Lavigne, 1999). Once 
transition begun ambiguous attitudes developed about FDI. 
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Table 1. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by region 1000000 US$
MacroRegion 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1985/1999 1985/1999
NATIONAL 1956 2244 2647 3740 3773 3705 4667 11292 27771 33946 37806 42135 52387 45463 40319 313849 %
 Beijing East 89 150 106 503 320 279 245 350 667 1372 1080 1553 1593 2168 1975 12449 4.1
 Tianjin East 56 51 133 61 31 37 133 108 614 1015 1521 2153 2511 2114 1764 12302 4.1
 Hebei East 8 11 10 19 44 44 57 113 397 523 547 830 1103 1429 1042 6177 2.0
 Shanxi Middle 1 0 5 7 10 3 4 54 86 32 64 138 269 245 391 1308 0.4
 Inner Mongolia Middle 3 7 5 6 4 11 2 5 85 40 58 72 73 91 65 527 0.2
 Liaonjng East 25 48 91 131 126 257 362 516 1279 1440 1425 1738 2366 2190 1062 13057 4.3
 Jilin Middle 5 24 7 10 10 18 32 75 275 242 408 452 402 409 301 2670 0.9
 Heilongjiang Middle 4 25 14 69 57 28 21 72 232 348 517 567 735 526 318 3534 1.2
 Shanghai East 108 149 214 233 422 174 145 494 3160 2473 2893 3941 4225 3602 2837 25069 8.3
 Jiangsu East 33 34 86 126 127 134 219 1463 2844 3763 5191 5210 5435 6632 6078 37375 12.4
 Zhejiang East 27 25 36 44 54 49 92 240 1032 1150 1258 1521 1503 1318 1233 9581 3.2
 Anhui Middle 3 35 3 28 9 14 11 55 258 370 483 507 434 277 261 2746 0.9
 Fujian East 119 63 55 145 348 320 471 1424 2874 3713 4044 4085 4197 4212 4024 30094 10.0
 Jiangxi Middle 10 9 5 9 9 8 19 100 208 262 289 301 481 465 321 2497 0.8
 Shandong East 36 66 65 90 163 186 216 1003 1874 2552 2689 2634 2776 2203 2259 18811 6.2
Henan Middle 8 11 14 64 46 11 38 53 305 387 479 524 692 617 521 3769 1.2
Hubei Middle 8 12 26 22 29 32 47 203 541 602 625 681 849 973 915 5564 1.8
Hunan Middle 27 10 3 13 23 14 25 133 437 331 508 745 917 818 654 4659 1.5
Guangdong East 605 802 685 1251 1323 1582 1943 3701 7556 9463 10260 11754 12635 12020 11658 87238 28.9
Guangxi East 31 49 45 21 53 36 32 182 885 836 673 663 886 886 635 5912 2.0
Hainan East 46 61 52 117 95 103 177 453 707 918 1062 789 706 717 484 6487 2.2
Sichuan West 29 32 24 40 13 24 81 112 571 922 542 441 666 804 580 4881 1.6
Guizhou West 10 12 0 10 13 11 14 20 43 64 57 31 50 45 41 420 0.1
Yunnan West 2 4 0 8 8 7 4 29 97 65 98 65 166 146 154 851 0.3
Tibet West 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0.0
Shaanxi West 16 37 73 112 97 47 32 46 234 239 324 326 628 300 242 2753 0.9
Gansu West 1 1 0 2 1 1 5 0 12 88 64 90 41 39 41 387 0.1
Qinghai West 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 3 2 2 1 2 0 5 19 0.0
Ningxia West 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 7 4 6 7 19 51 107 0.0
Xinjiang West 11 14 18 5 1 5 0 0 53 48 55 64 25 22 24 345 0.1
Note: In the period 1979-1984 China received 4103.85 US$ (1000000 US$)
* Among which Chongqing  431 in 1998 and 239 in 1999                      
Source: SSB (2000) and previous years.
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The historic meeting of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee (CC) of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held in December 1978, signs the beginning of the new era of 
reforms led by Deng Xiaoping. After two decades of almost total international economic isolation 
China started to open to the world to take advantage of international opportunities. The political 
isolation was interrupted in 1973 with the visit of the President of the USA Nixon. The ‘open door 
policy’ started after the process of “Reforms and Opening Up” with the establishment of the firstly 
four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in 1979 (similar but larger than Southeast Asia export 
processing zones) and later with the establishment the Special open areas and Coastal open cities. 
The aim of the “windows and bridges” policy was to concentrate foreign investment to control and 
to test its effects. The foreign capital through direct investment was an opportunity on one side for 
the modernisation increasing technological capabilities, efficiency and competitiveness. On the 
other, it introduced the first international markets’ signals and delineated the level of international 
market competition. 
The institutional reforms started with the first Law on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures enacted in 
July 1979. It was the landmark legislation on inward FDI, while the final permission and protection 
for foreign investors abide Chinese laws in 1982. Coastal development strategy passed in 1984 to 
further attract the investment from Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The coastal area policy gave a 
further push to inequality since East provinces had already an advantage in terms of the strategic 
location, human capital and physical infrastructure. Pro-coastal specific policies brought to an 
increasing disparity not only among East and inland provinces but also among areas of the same 
provinces influencing the migration flows within China and Chinese provinces. 
Later, from 1986 onward, specific encouragement (incentives) were given for export enterprises and 
technologically advanced enterprises. Economic and technological development zones were 
approved by the State Council and initially directed only for the open cities. Gain access to modern 
technology, both embodied and disembodied, packaged with capital, management skills and 
international networking had to be captured mainly through co-operative joint ventures involving 
long-term investment co-operation and possibly by Chinese satellite Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) mainly Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) throughout sub-contracting. The high 
technology exports as share of total exports passed from 6.5% in 1992 to 17.2% in 1999 (World 
Bank, WDI, 2001). Chinese enterprises were thus involved directly and indirectly with foreign 
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MNCs. For instance, at the end of 1996 the about 29,000 foreign funded Town and Township 
Enterprises TTE2 had 4 million of employees (FASC NACO, 1999). 
FDI inflow stagnated in China only in 1989. Due to ‘Tiananmen’ event the foreign countries 
announced a reduction in commercial relationship with PRC. Although a reduction was recorded 
(but only in the trend of FDI) the event increased the risk perception of foreign investors. 
Therefore, further regulations were introduced in the following years to reduce the foreign investors 
risk perception. In 1990 the use of the land by foreign investors was liberalised and foreign funded 
enterprises could have a foreign chairperson.  
Tax concessions in the form of reduced tax rates, tax holidays, and preferential deductions given to 
MNCs. Competition amongst provincial governments and municipalities bought to local investment 
in infrastructure, incentives in land use, preferential local taxes and special institutional 
arrangements. 
Further steps were thus taken under the WTO re-admittance incentive. In April 1991 the tax laws 
relating to foreign investors were harmonised. The Law fixed the tax rate at 33%, at 24% for the 14 
open cities and the open areas while at 15% for the SEZs. In 1992 a law to protect property right 
was introduced. 
In 1992 the Deng Xiaoping travel to South China gave an important sign of political stability and a 
direction to Chinese reforms thus pushing the process of overture implementing foreign investors 
trust. This paved the road to new reforms in the direction of further overture and in the view of the 
WTO re-admittance obtained in November 2001. China’s ‘opening to the world’ is now entering 
into the final phase. 
The Chinese economy was able to capture large part of the benefits thanks to its capabilities in 
terms of human capital, political stability and in definitive to the government capacity to control and 
reform the economic system. For instance, the transition from a socialist planned economy to a 
market socialist economy created many opportunities for collective and private enterprises to fill the 
gap among the demand and the supply that the planned system was not able to meet. 
Many East European countries, CIS and NIS adopting the ‘shock therapy’ did not give the time to 
national economic agents to adapt, to institution to evolve, to local entrepreneurs to emerge and to 
national firms to fill the demand-supply gap. The gradual and selective overture of the internal 
market to the international competition led space for the boom of the Chinese TVEs. 
Furthermore, the general success of the reforms triggered the inflow of FDI. The main attractions to 
foreign MNCs to invest in China were and still are the low labour cost (compared to the level of 
                                                          
2 A subset of TVEs characterised by having equal or over 8 employees and in being non-agricultural enterprises. 
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education) and especially the existence of a large domestic market. The increase in real income 
switch over a billion of “poor” into almost a billion of potential consumers. 
 
 
3. The theoretical and empirical arguments on the determinants of FDI 
 
The determinants of FDI location have been examined in the literature both form a theoretical and 
empirical point of view. This section is not intended to be review of this literature, but rather an 
elucidation of relevant issues for the empirical analysis regarding the Chinese case. 
From the literature emerges that the main theoretical approaches on the determinants of FDI 
location are three. The International Trade Approach which is based on the Hecksher-Ohlin-
Samuelson (HOS) model and which provide some explanations on the reasons for FDI if some 
central hypothesis are relaxed within the same framework (Helleiner, 1989). For instance, the 
Arbitrage theory introduced the capital mobility, and recently high skilled workers mobility 
hypothesis is introduced as well. The second approach is related to the Industrial Organisation 
Framework which is based on the Schumpeter’s theory of the role of the entrepreneur and thus 
explaining the FDI location in the process of innovating for profits. Within this approach other 
important theories emerged based on transaction costs and Social capital theory. The third approach 
is the Dunning’s Eclectic Approach named the OLI (Ownership, Location, Internalisation) 
framework which underlines that FDI takes place when internalising the market is preferable to 
other trading mechanism. This approach, which can be situated theoretically among the previous 
two, is based on the presence of three advantages of FDI (Ownership, location, Internalisation) 
which outweigh the costs of producing in a foreign country. The Ownership advantages occur when 
a firm has an advantage over rivals and want to maintain it -such as market access (brand name, 
reputation for quality), infrastructure, lower transaction or production costs, access to inputs, 
knowledge and so on-. The Location advantages result when a firm locate its production abroad 
instead of exporting because is more profitable. The benefits are based on comparative or 
transaction cost advantage such as greater access to the markets, lower input prices, lower 
production/transaction costs, lower transport costs, incentives due to policy promotion, lower 
tariffs. The Internalisation advantages reduce risk of market transaction through direct information 
and monitoring. 
A review of the empirical analyses on the determinants of FDI location are reported for instance in 
De Mello (1997) while a review on the Chinese case is reported in Cheng and Kwan (2000). Cheng 
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and Kwan themselves carried out an analysis on FDI location among Chinese provinces between 
1986 and 1995. 
From the OLI framework theoretical approach and the empirical analysis available in the literature 
it is possible to formulate an interpretative approach for different determinants of FDI location with 
a special focus on the Chinese case. 
The agglomeration effect is considered in the literature and empirical studies as a key determinant 
to explain ongoing inflow of FDI. This accounts for the self-perpetuating growth of FDI over time 
(Cheng and Kwan, 2000) In other words, the investment flow depends on the previous stock which 
indicates that the cost of entrance (barrier cost) is reduced. 
Foreign investors are interested to the attractiveness of the markets. The access to markets, for 
instance, is an important form of attraction of FDI. In general, it is the domestic market size that 
attracts MNCs investment. In the empirical literature, the market size is usually measured with the 
income per capita. However, this factor is considered more important in respect to other countries 
then among Chinese provinces. Furthermore, the MNCs usually looks for economic environment 
with a high market profitability. An interesting factor from this point of view is the profitability of 
the local enterprises. 
Another important factor of attraction -as gravity models underline- is the distance and the strategic 
location especially if FDI substitutes for trade. 
The production side attractiveness, connected to production costs, is found to be an important 
element in many studies. From a theoretical point of view, the labour costs is the most relevant 
among these factors. The empirical evidence is mixed in the case of this factor. 
Investment attractiveness for production is implemented by also by policy promotions. These are 
usually applied by developing countries governments to attract foreign capital. Therefore, the 
analysis of special policies is fundamental to explain the location of FDI since they tends to 
magnetise geographically the location FDI. Governments promotion of FDI inflows -such as 
preferential policies for special economic areas- have a positive effect since increase the incentives 
to invest. 
As argued extensively in the literature good factors endowments attract FDI. Human resources such 
as the level of education of the labour force are often considered before investing in a country by 
MNCs. Among factor endowments a relevant role is played by transportation infrastructure and in 
the case of developing countries and many transition economies by natural resources (for instance 
Russia and most of NIS cases more than 50% of FDI are directed to the energy sector). 
Social networks are considered a relevant factor in cross country analysis (languages/culture, 
colonial history). Chinese networks and the social capital reciprocity are well known. Indeed, 
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Chinese from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan and overseas Chinese are among the major investors 
to mainland China and among the cultural heritage they are familiar with Guanxi system. However, 
they assume an important role for FDI to China respect to other countries more then among Chinese 
provinces. 
Finally, political environment and in particular the political stability and thus the perceived risk is 
for MNCs a fundamental factor to decide where and when to invest. 
Along with these theoretical considerations based on the market and cost determinants and policy-
economic environment further determinants need to be considered for the transition economies and 
thus for the Chinese case. The institutional features of the recipient economy are important 
determinants for FDI, including the degree of political stability and government intervention in the 
economy (De Mello, 1997, Lavigne, 1999). 
The institutional reforms implemented and in particular the level of institutional changes should be 
included among the determinants of FDI. Indeed, these should increase the contracts enforcement 
and reduce the risk of investing in an ex-communist regime by reducing risk and transaction costs.  
Usually early investors in Communist-controlled country complained many operational problems 
such as high transaction costs and bureaucratic procedures, but also low legal rights of foreign 
firms, limitation on foreign ownership, property and profits tax system. Indeed, the foreign 
investors encountered difficulties if the economic system is still connected to the past planning 
system especially if State Owned Enterprises’ (SOEs) dominated often related to political adversity. 
Reforms in this direction tend to reinforce future FDI flows. Market formation and in particular the 
level of institutional changes incidence in the economic system are the factors to be considered at 
aggregate level. 
 
 
3.1. An interpretative model 
 
In order to examine the determinants of Chinese provincial FDI from 1986 to 1996 and to produce 
consistent estimates -taking into account the differences among the Chinese provinces-, panel 
analysis is applied. Panel analysis is particularly suitable for the Chinese case as it explicitly takes 
into account the provincial specific effects. 
The analysis starts theoretically from following relationship, 
 
FDIit = f (AFit-1, MAit, LPi, LAi, Iit, Hit, PCit, MTit, PE)       (1) 
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where FDI the dependent variable is the stock of FDI received by i which is an individual Chinese 
province (i = 1, ... , N) and t is the time period (t = 1, ... , T). 
The independent variables are: AF the FDI stock of the previous year which measure the 
agglomeration effect. MA is the market access or market attractiveness. LP represents the FDI 
policy promotion and LA the location advantages. Factor endowments are captured by I 
infrastructure and H human capital. PC are the production costs. While MT is the level of transition 
to the market or the incidence of institutional change in the provincial economic system. The PE i.e. 
the political and socio-economic environment that influenced the perception of risk to foreign 
investors on political stability and on the direction of the reforms and here, as we will explain, 
proxied with year dummies. 
Natural logarithms are used to transform and to linearise the functional relationship (1). The 
transformation reduce the overall variability of the data and thus the etheroschedasticity at the cross 
section level. The basic model becomes, 
 
ln (FDIit) = C + 1 ln (AFit-1) + 2 ln (MAit) + 3 LPi + 4 LAi +5 ln (Iit) +6 ln (Hit) +7 ln (PCit) +8 ln (MTit)+ PEi+uit 
 (2) 
 
Where uit = i + it is disturbance. The term i is the province-specific residual, it differs between 
provinces but, for any particular province, its value is constant. These provincial specific effects –
possibly unobservable- are correlated with other included variable in the specification of the above 
economic relationship. The term it is the stochastic disturbance (white noise). 
 
 
4. The data and the method for estimation procedure 
 
4.1. The data 
 
The data set used for the empirical analysis is constituted by annual data from 1986 to 1996 (11 
years). The data set previous 1997 eliminate the distortion effects due to the Asian economic crisis. 
for the 29 Chinese provinces, including the three municipalities of Beijing, Tianjing and Shanghai 
and four autonomous regions (excluding Tibet). All data (319 observations for each variable and 
132 if only the 12 coastal provinces are considered) are from the Chinese State Statistical Bureau 
(SSB, now National statistical Bureau -NSB) source. In particular, most of the data are compiled 
from the issues of the China Statistical Yearbook (CSY) of the SSB, and only some data series 
11 
 
before 1989 are compiled from Hsueh et al. (1993). For a summary of the original variables and 
aggregates used see table 2, while full definitions can be found in the explanatory notes of the CSY 
(SSB 1986, 1997) and of Hsueh et al. (1993)3. 
The SSB reports the FDI flow for each province in USD since 19854. The approach utilised in this 
research to estimated the each province Chinese FDI stocks for the period 1986 to 1996 at year end 
is based on the FDI flow data and by the following formula: 
FDIt = FDIt-1 + It - Wt           (3) 
with    it
h
1i
it I*wW 

  
where FDIt and FDIt-1 are respectively the FDI stock of the year t and of the year t-1; It and It-i are 
the FDI flows at year t and t-i respectively; Wt is the amount of FDI capital withdrawn from the 
productive process at year t; wi is the amount of the retired given a mortality function (the 
assumption given the technology involved is 10% per year). 
Therefore, considering that by SSB definition the net increase of FDI stock is equal to the total year 
FDI accumulation from equation (3) derives that: 
 
FDIt = FDIt-1 + At    (given At = It - Wt = FDI = FDIt - FDIt-1)    (4) 
 
                                                          
3 Corrections have been made to the data set when obvious mistakes, arising out of compilation or editing problems, were discovered 
during an examination of the distribution of the variables data series for specific provinces and for the national total. Moreover, until 
1987 Hainan and Guangdong provinces data were jointly reported; therefore, in order to maintain these provinces in the analysis the 
data for years 1986 and 1987 were compiled from Hsueh et al. (1993) or calculated by the assumption that the respective weights are 
the same as in 1988, while the stock of human capital is assumed to have the same composition for the two provinces. 
4 Direct Investment by Foreign Entrepreneurs refers to the investments inside China by foreign enterprises and economic 
organizations or individuals (including overseas Chinese, compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao, and Chinese enterprises 
registered abroad), following the relevant policies and laws of China, for the establishment of ventures exclusively with foreign own 
investment, Sino-foreign joint ventures and cooperative enterprises or for co-operative exploration of resources with enterprises or 
economic organizations in China. It includes the re investment of the foreign entrepreneurs with the profits gained from the 
investment and the funds that enterprises borrow from abroad in the total investment of projects which are approved by the relevant 
department of the government. 
Data come from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and are tabulated in accordance with the Table FCS-5 and 
Table FCS-6 in the “Statistical Scheme on the Utilization of Foreign Capital” designed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation and the National Bureau of Statistics in November of 1996, which are data of complete enumeration. The 
statistical coverage includes all the units and departments which have utilized foreign capital and all the Sino-foreign joint ventures, 
Sino-foreign cooperative enterprises, ventures exclusively with foreign investment, foreign-funded stock companies, Sino-foreign 
cooperative development projects and other corporate enterprises (including the enterprises funded by the entrepreneurs from Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan) with independent accounting system which have been approved by the Chinese government to set up in 
the boundary of the Peoples Republic of China. 
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Since the SSB reports the provincial data of the flow of FDI from 1985 the data of FDI are added 
over time to form FDI stock5. They are firstly changed into yuan utilising the official foreign 
exchange rate. The FDI is deflated for each province using the overall provincial retail price indices 
-base 1990- (the overall retail price index is preferred because it varies across the provinces); the 
summed accumulations (At or FDI flows) are deflated as suggested by the Chow (1993) approach. 
For instance, following the formula (4) the FDI stock at the end of 1986 is: 
 
    FDI86 year end = FDI85 year end + A86          (5) 
 
which is equal by definition to the capital stock at the beginning of the following year 1986. 
Considering the independent variables used, the agglomeration effect (AF) is measured by the stock 
of FDI in the previous year. 
The market access (MA) is proxied by the Gross domestic product (GDP) (at end-year) per capita 
which should captures the attractiveness of the Chinese provincial markets. The GDP and the other 
monetary variables -expressed in current price (yuan)- have been deflated using the same index of 
FDI. The market attractiveness or profitability from the productive side is proxied by profits per 
employee in collective TVEs given their competitiveness and mixed properties. 
Policy promotion (LP) and location advantages (LA) in the Chinese case coincide geographically. 
They are proxied by two dummies one (EAST) for the East or Coastal provinces which identify the 
strategic location in terms of trade opportunity costs and of the overall policy promotion since 1984 
towards the coastal provinces. The other dummy SEZ is to capture the effect of the provinces with a 
Special Economic Zone individuating thus the coastal provinces with the highest policy promotion 
for FDI inflow. In order to take into account the policy promotion and the provincial location we 
also decided to divide the provincial data set into two parts to carry out the estimates separately for 
the overall Chinese provinces and for the coastal provinces only. 
Among the factor endowments, the human capital (H) is approximated by the ratio of the stock of 
university qualified people (UNI) over the stock of illiterate and semi-illiterate (ILL) and by the 
ratio among the educated people -ED, with at least primary education (PR)- and ILL6.  
                                                          
5 Assumption made is that FDI -from 1979 to 1984- as null before 1985; 99% of FDI was directed to East or Coastal China. 
6 The provincial data on human capital stock are from the last two National Population’s Census of 1982 (Third Census) and 1990 
(Fourth Census). The data of each province for each year are calculated considering the annual rates of growth for each province of 
the human capital stocks between 1982 and 1990. The only discrepancy, although not relevant from a point of view of the analysis is 
that in 1990 the number of illiterate and semi-illiterate per thousand is referred to people aged over 6 while for 1982 is refereed to 
people aged over 12. 
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Considering aggregate physical infrastructures (I), here they are proxied by a “space-serving” 
infrastructure density index as the access to an area by waterway, highway or railway is 
indispensable before other economic activities can unfold there (see    )7. Another proxy used for 
investment is the amount of provincial capital stock (see    ). 
Production costs advantage (PC) are captured by the wage per employee in the collective TVE 
sector. 
In order to measure approximately the “phase” of the transition from the “planned socialist 
economy” to the “market socialist economy” and to understand if different effective institutional 
changes affected the FDI, an ad hoc index is used. The market transition (MT) index utilised is 
given by the share on the total industrial (TI) Gross output value (GOV) of the SOEs. Non-SOEs or 
other industries (OI) are: rural industries -private and collective TVEs-, urban enterprises and 
foreign enterprises. Therefore, the index SO/TI should “measure” the non-marketisation of the 
provincial economic systems which should influence negatively the willing of foreign to invest. 
The unfavourable political and socio-economic environment, which increases the perception risk by 
foreign investors, is proxied by three year dummies 1989, 1990 and 1991 since it embrace all the 
provinces. The instability was due to the Tiananmen event and internal political repression with the 
consequent increase in perceived risk by foreign investors for the fear of a return to previous 
policies. These are also the years following the austerity policies launched in December 1988. 
A positive relation is expected for 1993 which, as we wrote, is the year following important changes 
and the Deng Xiaoping tour to South China. Other legislative measures were introduced in 1992 to 
reduce the risk of investing in China such as property right protection. 
 
4.2. The method for estimation procedure 
 
The matrix version of the model (1) is as follows, 
 
 ln (yit) =  0 + ln (x’it)  + ln (z’i)  + d’t  + uit        (6) 
 
where i and t represent respectively provinces (i = 1, ... , N) and time periods (t = 1, ...,  T); yit is the 
dependent variable for individual i at time t; 0 is the general constant; xit is the kx1 vector (of the 
explicative variables for individual i at time t (time variant); zi is the vector of hx1 independent 
                                                          
7 Although the human capital stock indices focus only on formal education received, and that the infrastructure indices represent only 
the “space-serving” infrastructure these indices can be considered a good approximation of both human capital and physical 
infrastructures. 
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variables unit i time constant (time invariant); dt is 3x1 time dummy vector;  is the kx1 vector of 
coefficients of the xit;  is the vector of hx1 of the parameters (coefficients) of zi;  is coefficient of 
the dt; uit = i + it is disturbance term8, where the term i  represents the specific individual effect 
and it is the stochastic disturbance defined as: E()= 0,  E(2)= s2  and E (it,  js) = 0 for ts  or  ij. 
Panel analysis is applied to produce consistent estimates. 
Considering that some of the variable of the model are time invariant, the scheme adopted for the 
estimation is as follows. First an F-test is carried out to test if the individual (i.e. provincial) 
intercepts are significantly different, if so this would require the use of panel estimators. 
Consistent with our expectation of strong provincial differences, the F-test rejects the null 
hypothesis of intercepts equality. In order to estimate the coefficient of the time-invariant variable, a 
random effects approach can be used without loss of generality (see Fass, McFadden, Mundlak 
1978). As expected, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of orthogonality between 
individual effects and regressors, and therefore a Hausman-Taylor instrumental variables estimator 
is used to produce estimates of the whole coefficients set (Hausman and Taylor, 1981, Hsiao, 1986). 
 
 
5. Empirical results and interpretations 
 
The empirical results of the model (6) are reported in table 2. The estimates are obtained utilising 
the two data sets one of all Chinese provinces (columns [1] and [2]) and the other for the 12 coastal 
provinces (column [3]). Consistent with the expectation of strong provincial differences, the F-test 
rejects the null hypothesis of intercepts equality. In general, both the adjusted R2 and the t-statistics 
are remarkably high. Considering that the results are quite stable, the estimates of the coefficients of 
each independent variable can be examined together. 
                                                          
8 Where: uit  represents individual and time variation effects. Typically i e it  are assumed to be independent. If the i are 
considered as constants, the econometric model is a fixed effect model (FE); if the i  are considered as random variables, the model 
is a random effect model (RE). In both cases it is a random variable (white noise). 
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Table 2. Regression on FDI stock (1986-1996). Estimated coefficients of model (6) (a). 
 
     Dependent variable FDI stock [1] [2] [3] 
  Regressors                                                                       Region PRC PRC Coastal 
FDIt-1 (AF) Foreign Direct Investment stock time t-1 .855*** .851*** .726*** 
 (.019) (.020) (.035) 
GDPR_POP (MA) Real GDP per capita -.110 -.190 -.046 
 (.086) (.103) (.115) 
PROF_L  (MA) Profits per employee   .259*** 
   (.054) 
EAST (LP, LA) Location and policy promotion dummy .158*** .362***  
 (.078) (.113)  
SEZ (LP, LA) Location and policy promotion dummy   .498*** 
   (.145) 
I   (I) Space-serving infrastructural index .187 .100  
 (.111) (.122)  
K  (I) Capital stock   .128* 
   (.073) 
ED/ILL  (H) Educated people (at least primary school)/ ILL .273*** .275*** .378*** 
 (.094) (.094) (.194) 
WAGE_L (PC)  Wage per employee  .107  
  (.164)  
SO/TI (MT) Industrial GOV of SOE sector/GOV of industrial sector -.253*** -.218*** -.330*** 
 (.094) (.102) (.104) 
Dummy 1989 (Unfavourable socio-economic environment dummy) -.334*** -.351*** -.135** 
 (.070) (.072) (.065) 
Dummy 1990 (Unfavourable socio-economic environment dummy) -.342*** -.352*** -.133** 
 (.070) (.071) (.066) 
Dummy 1991 (Unfavourable socio-economic environment dummy) -.285*** -.289*** -.132** 
 (.068) (.069) (.067) 
Dummy 1993 (Favourable socio-economic environment dummy) .419*** .424*** .319*** 
 (.067) (.068) (.0617) 
C -2.26*** 1.80 -.641*** 
 (.756) (.1.192) (.942) 
Balanced data N (provinces) 29 29 12 
Number of observations (Nobs) 319 319 132 
Degree of freedom  309 308 121 
Adjusted R2 .963 .962 .981 
F test of A,B=Ai,B:  2.38 2.38 6.06 
F(30, Nobs-N-k)             P-value [.000] [.000] [.000] 
Hausman test  CHISQ (k) of 39.97 39.80 38.16 
H0: FE vs. RE                  P-value [.000] [.000] [.000] 
Estimator used HT HT HT 
 
(a) Standard-error in parenthesis. significant at 1% level ***, at 5% level **, at 10% level *. 
ILL Illiterate and semi-illiterate people. Tibet is excluded. 
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Consistent with the theoretical approach the agglomeration effect -proxied by the FDI stock of the 
previous year- is positive and significant. The investment flow is affected by the previous stock. 
The attractiveness of the Chinese provincial markets –proxied by GDP per capita- is found non 
significant underlining that the foreign investors are interested in the Chinese market as a whole 
more than the provincial specific markets. Furthermore, it is important to remember that a large part 
of Chinese exports are from FDI. 
From the productive side the market attractiveness or profitability, proxied by profits per employee 
in collective TVEs, is found positive and significant. 
Policy promotion and location advantages dummies -which coincide geographically- underline the 
importance of location and policy promotion for the inflow of FDI. The East dummy for the overall 
Chinese province and the SEZ dummy for the Coastal provinces are found positive and significant. 
Among factor endowments, the coefficient of human capital (H) is positive and significant 
underlining that foreign investors in China tend to chose the location -given the other conditions- 
with a higher human capital. Between 1992 and 1999 the high technology exports as share of total 
exports increased of more than 10%. The index for infrastructure (I) is found not significant. This is 
probably due to the fact that infrastructure to attract FDI are in specific locations of the provinces 
leaving untouched the rest of the province. Therefore, a better proxy could the capital stock which is 
found positive and significant. 
The production costs (PC) are approximated by the wage per employee in the collective TVE 
sector. Although positive this factor is found non-significant. This seems coherent with the Chinese 
case. The difference up to nowadays (this could change in the next future) was not done by labour 
cost for two reasons. Once a MNCs invest is more interested in the presence of skilled workers. 
Then, wages for unskilled persons are maintained quite low by internal migration. 
The variable that proxies the level of institutional changes and market transition (MT) is found -as 
expected- negative and significant. A province dominated by SOEs system is less attractive for 
foreign investors since influence their perception of investing in an ex-communist regime. This is 
probably connected to two aspects: on one side that the local government adversity or better retain 
to changes, on the other side is the capability to translate the institutional changes into practice. 
Finally, the unfavourable political and socio-economic environment captured by year dummies are 
found as expected negative and significant for 1989, 1990, 1991 and the favourable political and 
socio-economic environment in 1993 positive and significant. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical approach -based on the OLI framework- 
and with previous empirical studies. Almost all variables follows the theoretical prediction. In 
particular, the agglomeration effect, policy promotion, location advantages, profitability, human 
capital, capital stock and a favourable political and socio-economic environment are found to affect 
positively FDI. An unfavourable political and socio-economic environment influences negatively 
the FDI inflow. Other factors such as market access GDP per capita and wage costs were found not 
significant. The infrastructural index is non significant denoting probably a wrong index for the 
context studied since FDI are located in precise areas. 
In addition to previous studies we find support that for transition economies more factors needs to 
be considered among the determinants of FDI. The variable used to proxy the level of institutional 
changes is found to affect the FDI location. In particular, provinces which a SOEs’ dominance 
influence negatively the FDI inflow. 
In terms of socio-economic development for the recipient countries the Chinese case illuminate on 
the fact that long term benefits and advantages of foreign investment cannot captured automatically 
with the simple attraction of FDI. Policy accompanying this process are fundamental for their 
strategic success. The Chinese economy was able to capture large part of the benefits thanks to its 
capabilities in terms of human capital, political stability and in definitive to the government 
capacity to control and reform the economic system which reduced the “predatory practice” of 
MNCs by selecting the FDI on the base of Chinese future comparative advantages. The gradual 
policies towards opening the economic system -although the protection was gradually eroded- 
helped the economic agents to adjust to the institutional change and increase their competitiveness 
during time. Furthermore, the Chinese Government did not use FDI to privatise all the best SOEs as 
many countries in Eastern Europe and CIS did after 1992. Moreover, since the transition from a 
socialist planned economy to a market socialist economy creates many opportunities for private and 
semi-private enterprises to fill the gap among the demand and the supply that the planned system 
was not able to meet. Many East European countries, CIS and NIS adopting the ‘shock therapy’ did 
not give the time to national economic agents to adapt, to institution to evolve, to local 
entrepreneurs to emerge and to national firms to fill the supply-demand gap. The gradual and 
selective overture of the internal market to the international competition led space for the boom of 
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the Chinese TVEs. A dynamic Small and Medium Enterprises SMEs sector has the capability to 
capture the spillovers effects having an active role in Chinese economic development.  
Nowadays trade policies are always less under the control of Chinese Government since the PRC 
re-joined WTO in 2001. The inequalities generated by the new reforms for WTO mainly towards 
inland farmers and SOEs employees are at the base for internal instability. This could produce a 
destabilisation effect considering that at the same time Chinese farmers and un-skilled workers are 
loosing the benefit from public basic social services and protection. West policies promoted by the 
government which include infrastructure, human development and FDI strategy are thought to dam 
this destabilisation. 
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